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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred by Article I, 
Section 12, Utah Constitution, Section 77-1-6 and 77-35-26, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Rule 3, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. This is an appeal from a criminal conviction 
for the violation of Section 41-6-44, Driving Under the Influ-
ence, a Class B misdemeanor, which was entered in the Fourth 
Circuit Court following trial before the Honorable Lynn Davis. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether discretion of persons empowered with filing 
in either Justice or Circuit Courts for original prosecution is 
so broad as to enable complainant to decide, in advance, whether 
a defendant will or will not have a right to an appeal to a 
reviewing court. 
2. Whether Rule 26(13)(a), Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure, unconstitutionally denies a defendant the right to 
appellate review of a criminal conviction. 
3. Whether Rule 26(13)(a), Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied, where 
the acquittal of one provision (of DUI) may be tried anew on de 
novo appeal, thereby placing a defendant twice in jeopardy. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken from the judgment and conviction 
entered against Appellant on May 22, 1989, for the crime of 
Driving Under the Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, following a 
bench trial before the Honorable Lynn Davis, Fourth Circuit 
Court, on November 18, 1988. 
The appeal is founded on constitutional grounds assert-
ing that the statutory scheme under Rule 26(13)(a), Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure, is unconstitutional on its face and as 
applied in this case, where it denies a defendant the right to 
appellate review except on narrow constitutional grounds, pro-
vides a de_ novo trial on "appeal" from the Justicefs Court which 
enables the State to place a defendant twice in jeopardy on 
charges which resulted in acquittal where he exercises his right 
to appeal from a conviction on other charges or on the basis that 
the decisions of a Justice of the Peace are not those of a court 
of record and cannot therefore be relied upon in the later de 
novo Circuit Court proceeding and on other constitutional 
grounds. 
Appellant was charged in the Justice Court, Nephi 
Precinct, Judge Lane L. Harward, presiding with, inter alia, of 
the Class B misdemeanor offense of Driving Under the Influence 
(DUI) by Information dated June 23, 1988, which charged said 
crime in the disjunctive, i.e., that on or about February 14, 
1988, he unlawfully did 
"(D)rive . . . a motor vehicle . . . (with a) 
blood alcohol content (of) .08 percent or 
greater 
- OR -
" . . . (while) under the influence of alco-
hol; contrary to Section 41-6-44, U.C.A. 
1953 as amended." R.4. 
Following trial on June 23, 1988, Judge Harward ex-
pressly found the evidence to be insufficient as to the "under 
the influence" (impairment) alternative of 41-6-44; however, he 
found Appellant guilty as charged based upon the ".08 percent" 
alternative based upon the admission of a breath test of .14%. 
(See unsigned Judgment, R. 16-19.) 
Appellant appealed from the judgment of conviction to 
the Fourth Circuit Court, Nephi Department, on or about June 29, 
1988, (R. 9-10), and was arraigned thereat on August 26, 1988. 
(R. 23). 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Lynn Davis on 
November 18, 1988, without a jury. Prior to trial, Appellant's 
counsel objected to the inclusion of the "impairment" alternative 
of 41-6-44 in the charge and moved to strike it from the Informa-
tion on the basis that the Justice Court had acquitted Appellant 
as to that particular provision on the finding of insufficient 
evidence and, therefore, retrial of that provision would consti-
tute double jeopardy. Trial Transcript (Tr.), p. 4, 1.2 - p. 6, 
1. 14. 
The motion was taken under advisement and the trial 
proceeded. The arresting officer, UHP Trooper Carl Howard 
stopped Appellant for driving in excess of the speed limit and 
for changing lanes one time without signalling over the course of 
a 1 1/2 mile stretch of 1-15. (Tr. 16-17.) 
Trooper Howard presented the same testimony as in the 
previous trial wherein he recalled the Appellant's performance of 
certain field sobriety tests by describing the tests he requested 
and giving his opinion of the evidentiary weight of the perfor-
mance as proof of impairment. The said tests were not given by 
Howard in the manner prescribed by the Highway Patrol to ensure 
evaluative trustworthiness or uniformity of performance, (accord-
ing to the State's own breath test expert, Trooper Gary Howard, 
at pages 61 to 73 of the Trial Transcript herein.) 
The State did not offer as an exhibit the published 
Regulations of the Commissioner of Public Safety regarding breath 
testing requirements as mandated by 41-6-44(3) nor did it offer 
proof that Trooper Howard followed the said regulations in 
obtaining the breath test (of 14%). In fact, Trooper Howard 
admitted he didn't know what the regulations required of him. 
Q. (By Mr. DeLand) . . . you don't know then 
whether the steps that you took . . . were in 
compliance with the Commissioner's regu-
lations, do you? 
A. (By Trooper Howard) No, I don't. 
(Tr. p. 55, 1. 16-20). 
Further, the State did not offer credible evidence to 
meet its burden of showing Trooper Howard was certified to 
operate the breath testing machine on February 14, 1988. 
The evidence offered to prove his certification was a 
certification card which showed an expiration date of "2-90" 
which, if Howard were following the two year certification 
regulation meant that he was certain from "sometime" in February, 
1988, until "sometime" in February, 1989. Since the instant test 
was given on the exact middle of the month of February, 1988, 
Appellant argued that it is equally likely that Howard's certi-
fication was earned post-February 14th as prior thereto. Since 
it is the State's burden to prove that the breath test operator 
was certified at the moment the test was given, Appellant moved 
to exclude the breath test results. 
On or about February 16, 1989, Judge Davis filed a 
written ruling which denied all of Appellant's Motions to sup-
press evidence, strike the "impairment" provision of the Informa-
tion, dismiss the charge, etc. (R. 40-43.) 
On May 22, 1989, Appellant was sentenced. (R. 48.) 
I 
After a court-ordered extension of time to file (R. 51), Appel-
lant filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court, on June 26, 1989. 
(R. 52.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. LIMITED JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURT ON DE NOVO 
As outlined in 78-4-7.5, Utah Code Annotated, the 
Circuit Court has appellate jurisdiction to hear trials de novo 
of the judgments of the justices1 courts; but only on the "judg-
ment" from which Defendant appeals. In Matus, the Justices1 
Court's judgment of conviction was specifically limited to the 
".08" element of DUI. The court found that the conjunctive 
element of "impairment" lacked sufficient proof and was therefore 
excluded from the judgment. Even though both conjunctive ele-
ments of DUI were charged, only one survived below. The judgment 
of conviction below went only to the ".08" element. The de novo 
trial "amended" the Justice's express judgment by adding the 
"impairment" element back in, therebv exceeding its jurisdiction 
by denying Defendant's motion to amend Information. 
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
The first trial judge in Matus found the evidence on 
impairment insufficient to convict. Amendment V of the U.S. 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
prohibit placing a person twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Sections 76-1-402 and 403, Utah Code Annotated further bar 
subsequent prosecution for an offense where a trial court has 
found insufficient evidence to convict. Therefore, inclusion of 
the "impairment" alternative of 41-6-44 in the charge and retrial 
of that provision; whereby the Justice Court had acquitted Matus 
as to that particular provision on the finding of insufficient 
evidence, constitutes double jeopardy. 
III. ADMISSION OF BREATH TEST UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The admission of breath tests without proof of compli-
ance was plain error and an arbitrary and capricious denial of 
due process in violation of Section 41-6-44.3, Utah Code Annotat-
ed, and standards as outlined by the Commissioner of Public 
Safety. 
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL DENIAL OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Rule 26(13) (a), Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, denies 
some defendants equal protection of the laws and the right to 
review. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S JURISDICTION IS DERIVATIVE AND 
IS THEREFORE LIMITED TO DE NOVO TRIAL PER 
THE EXACT LANGUAGE OF THE APPEALED JUDGMENT 
Defendant's appeal grants him a trial de novo in this 
Court, but only on the "judgment" from which he appeals. 
(U.C.A., 78-4-7.5.) Therefore, if a defendant is convicted of 
two offenses in the Justices' Court and only appeals from one 
such judgment, he may only receive a trial de novo on the one 
appealed. 
The Circuit Courts' jurisdiction on appeal is deriva-
tive. Even though the appellate proceeding is de novo, the 
Circuit only obtains jurisdiction over the appealed ruling. 
Spangler v. District Court, 140 P.2d 755 (1943). Thus, where a 
Complaint was defective on one element but the Justice of the 
Peace found the defendant guilty nevertheless, the de novo 
appellate court properly denied the state's motion to amend the 
Complaint to conform with the law and dismissed the charge. 
State v. Mansfield, 576 P.2d 1276 (1978). 
Under the Mansfield reasoning, had this Defendant 
(Matus) been charged with DUI in the Justices1 Court by an 
Information which failed to allege the "impairment" section of 
41-6-44, the Circuit Court could not allow the Information to be 
amended by addition of the negligently omitted language. (At 
1277.) 
In this case the Justices1 Court's judgment of con-
viction is specifically limited to the ".08%" element of DUI and 
expressly finds in the memorandum decision that the conjunctive 
element of "impairment" lacked sufficient proof and was therefore 
excluded from the judgment, thereby basing the conviction solely 
on the elements of: 
1. Driving a motor vehicle; 
2. With a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater. 
Section 41-6-44 allows the State to prove either (or 
both) element(s) for conviction. It could not prove the "impair-
ment" (albeit unnecessary) element in the first trial. 
The State now seeks to do the reverse of Mansfield. 
I.e., even though both conjunctive elements were charged, only 
one survived below, it being implicit, therefore, that the court 
below "amended" the charge to conform with the evidence. 
The judgment of conviction below went only to the ".08" 
element. Ergo, a de novo trial beyond that decision would, in 
essence, "amend" the Justice's express judgment by adding the 
"impairment" element back in. 
Since this Defendant only appealed from the express 
Judgment and the State filed no appeal/ this Court would exceed 
its jurisdiction by denying Defendant's motion herein. 
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRECLUDES DE NOVO REVIEW OF "IMPAIRMENT" 
Amendment V of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution prohibit placing a person 
twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Further, Sections 76-1-402 and 403, Utah Code Annotated 
bar subsequent prosecution for an offense where a trial court has 
found insufficient evidence to convict; however, it may affirm a 
conviction or allow a retrial on an included offense if there was 
sufficient evidence at trial to support a conviction of the 
included offense which occurred during the single criminal 
episode. (76-1-402(5); 76-1-403(2), U.C.A.) 
Where the trial court has entered a judgment or final 
order "for the Defendant", further prosecution inconsistent with 
the judgment or order is barred. (76-1-403(1) (b)(iv)). 
In Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 
U.S. 294 (1984), the Supreme Court viewed a de novo trial system 
like Utah's to be a single, continuing process. On point, the 
Court held that only an "official finding" by the lower court of 
"insufficiency of the evidence" would bar a retrial. Lydon was 
not entitled to an appellate review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence at the first trial but could require subsequent courts 
to adopt official findings favorable to him. 
The strict rule of appellate review is to permit 
retrial where the trial court's evidentiary rulings are in issue 
but bar retrial when the issue is sufficiency of the evidence. 
The landmark case adopting the strict rule on jeopardy, 
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), was applied to the 
states in Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978) and Sanabria v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978). 
Even prior to Burks, the Court held in favor of barring 
retrial in cases similar to Matus. In Green v. United States, 
355 U.S. 184 (1957), the defendant was charged with arson and 
first degree murder. The jury found Green guilty of an arson and 
second degree murder. The conviction was reversed on appeal and 
remanded and a second jury found him guilty of arson and first 
degree murder. The Green court held that the first jury, by 
finding Green guilty of second degree murder, had implicitly 
found insufficient evidence of first degree; therefore, the 
double jeopardy clause forbade a subsequent charge/prosecution 
for a first degree. In other words, the second indictment (or 
information) could not include the element(s) of first degree 
murder in its charge. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has defined the test for the 
instant case: "The applicable rule is that where the same act or 
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are 
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires 
proof of a fact which the other does not." Block-Burger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 
161 (1977). 
A person may be convicted of DUI per the "impaired" 
driver provision of 41-6-44(1)(a) with evidence of a breath/blood 
alcohol test; however, a test showing a BAC of .08% or greater 
not only infers "impairment", it constitutes the offense by 
itself as being presumptive of impairment. Therefore, jeopardy 
concepts do apply in this case since the first trial judge, by 
written order or judgment, found the evidence insufficient to 
convict. 
III. THE ADMISSION OF APPELLANT'S BREATH TEST 
HEREIN WITHOUT PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
COMMISSIONER'S REGULATIONS IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL, 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 
AND/OR DEMONSTRATES THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OR 
INVALIDITY OF THE CONTROLLING STATUTE ON ITS FACE 
Section 41-6-44.3, U.C.A., says the Commissioner of 
Public Safety "shall" establish standards regarding breath 
testing. Those standards, as confirmed by witness Trooper 
Taylor, mandate specific steps for acceptable breath test results 
and require operators to be fully certified at "the moment" the 
test is given, which certification must be renewed at regular and 
specified intervals. 
The breath test operator in this case, Trooper Howard, 
testified that he did not know whether he followed the commis-
sioner's regulations in this instance since he was not familiar 
with them. The regulations, though in Trooper Taylor's pos-
session at trial, were not introduced. 
There was no testimony or other evidence at trial as to 
whether Trooper Howard was certified to operate the breath 
testing instrument when he administered the subject test to Mr. 
Matus, herein, on February 14, 1988. 
The only related evidence was the admitted exhibit, 
i.e., Howard's present record of certification, which showed it 
was due to expire in February of 1990, viz., "2/90." It did not 
state when it was issued. 
The requirements of 41-6-44.3 are such that the prose-
cution has the burden of providing the court with the foundation 
mandated "according to the standards" before the court may 
properly admit the breath test results. No such burden was met 
in this case. 
1. The court cannot determine compliance with the 
standards without knowing what they mandate, particularly where 
the operator-witness doesn't know, himself; 
2. Since no evidence is before the court as to Trooper 
Howard's certification status at test-time, the court may not 
infer such; 
3. Even if, as argued by Defendant at trial, it were 
stipulated that "the standards" require certification not longer 
than every two years, the exhibit regarding Howard's certifica-
tion is still insufficient proof of his status on February 14, 
1988. At best, the court may infer Howard's certification was 
obtained sometime in "2/88". Two years in any legal context is 
not two years and one day. 
Since the certification expires in February, 1988, the 
most favorable inference for the State is that he renewed it in 
February of 1988. But when? It is equally possible that he was 
certified before or after the 14th. 
Ties go to the accused. It is the State's burden to 
prove the operator was certified . . . by written record or by 
his testimony. Mr. Eyre argued that Trooper Taylor had all 
troopers' certification records and "could be" called to produce 
them; however, no such evidence was offered, nor did Howard 
testify on point. 
50/50 is not even a preponderance. The court would be 
left to speculate, not infer a proper foundation, even if this 
test were given on February 27th. 
The rules regarding presumptions of fact require a 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt, upon the evidence, before 
accepting the presumption. 
"If presumptions of fact are inconsistent, the presump-
tion applies that is founded upon weightier considerations of 
policy." Rule 301(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Defendant submits that the weightiest presumption of 
all is the "presumption of innocence". 76-1-501, U.C.A.; U.S. 
Constitution, Amendment V.; Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 
XII. 
It follows that a presumption of compliance with "the 
standards", (including Howard1s certification) is a presumption 
of factual foundation for admission of the test per 41-6-44.3 
which, in turn "presumes" the trustworthiness of the test results 
which exceed .08%. Therefore, the court has presumed the proof 
of an element of this offense. "The" element, in fact. Such a 
presumption (of an element), is unconstitutional. Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 
(1983). 
Further, the admission was plain error per the holdings 
in Williams v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1354 (CA Utah 1987) and 
Harry v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344 (CA Utah 1987) which hold 
that it is arbitrary and capricious for the court to admit breath 
tests without proof of compliance with the Commissioner's regu-
lations, including proof of the operator's certification. 
IV. RULE 26(13)(a), UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DENIES THE 
RIGHT TO APPELLATE REVIEW IN APPEALS 
FROM JUSTICE TO CIRCUIT COURTS 
Rule 26 sets out the bases and procedures for criminal 
appeals. In all cases but one, there is an appeal as of right 
from any final judgment at at least one level of appellate review 
of the record. 
Only in the instant instance is the right to review 
denied. Since justice courts are not courts of record, only de 
novo appeals lie. This scheme denies the equal protection of the 
laws to some defendants and can, as here, deny a defendant the 
use of a record which would preclude the state from placing 
defendants twice in jeopardy or from being subjected to the state 
using the trial and error method of prosecuting defendant once as 
a rehearsal then again after curing their evidentiary or other 
errors. 
CONCLUSION 
In Matus, the Circuit Court on de novo exceeded its 
jurisdiction by denying Defendant's motion to amend Information; 
included the "impairment" alternative and retrial of same con-
stituting double jeopardy; admitted breath tests without proof of 
compliance; and denied Appellant equal protection of the laws and 
the right to review. This matter should be reversed and ordered 
dismissed by this Court. 
DATED this V~l day of October, 1989. 
LONI F. DeLAND 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ff day of October, 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with 
postage prepaid fully thereon, to the Juab County Attorney, 125 
North Main, Nephi, Utah 84648. 
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Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
1896 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 , U.C.A. 
S 4 1 - 6 - . 4 4 ( l ) ( a ) , U . C A , 
§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 ( 3 ) , U.C.A. 
§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 3 f U.C.A. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drug or with specified or unsafe 
blood alcohol concentration — Mea-
surement of blood or breath alcohol — 
Criminal punishment — Arrest with-
out warrant — Penalties — Suspension 
or revocation of license. 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person to operate or be in 
actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown 
by a chemical test given within two hours afu i 
the alleged operation or physical control, or if the 
person is under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violat-
ing this section is or has been legally entitled to 
use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of 
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall 
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath. 
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time 
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a 
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result 
of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence 
is that of simple negligence, the failure to exer-
cise that degree of care which an ordinarily rea-
sonable and prudent person exercises under like 
or similar circumstances. 
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Sub-
section (3), the court shall, upon a first conviction, 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 
consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with em-
phasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or 
require the person to work in a community-service 
work program for not less than 24 hours nor more 
than 50 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or 
the work in the community-service work program, 
order the person to participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation 
facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years 
after a first conviction under this section or un-
der a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 
41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addition to any 
penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a 
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 con-
secutive hours nor more than 720 hours, with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, 
or require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 80 hours 
nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the 
jail sentence or the work in the community-ser-
vice work program, order the person to partici-
pate in an assessment and educational series at a 
licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. The court 
may, in its discretion, order the person to obtain 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five 
years after a second conviction under this section 
or under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 
41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addition to any 
penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a 
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor 
more than 2,160 hours with emphasis on serving 
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the per-
son to work in a community-service work pro-
gram for not less than 240 nor more than 720 
hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or 
work in the community-service work program, 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alco-
hol rehabilitation facility. 
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under 
Subsection (3) may be suspended and the con-
victed person is not eligible for parole or proba-
tion until any sentence imposed under this sec-
tion has been served. Probation or parole result-
ing from a conviction for a violation of this sec-
tion or a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) 
may not be terminated and the department may 
not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as 
a result of the conviction, if it is a second or sub-
sequent conviction within five years, until the 
convicted person has furnished evidence satisfac-
tory to the department that all fines and fees, 
including fees for restitution and rehabilitation 
costs, assessed against the person, have been 
paid. 
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) 
that require a sentencing court to order a con-
victed person to: participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol reha-
bilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the 
court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation fa-
cility; or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an 
alcohol rehabilitation facility; or do any combina-
tion of those things, apply to a conviction for a 
violation of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a 
prior offense under Subsection (7). The court is 
required to render the same order regarding edu-
cation or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation 
facility, or both, in connection with a first, sec-
ond, or subsequent conviction under Section 
41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under 
Subsection (7), as the court would render in con-
nection with applying respectively, the first, sec-
ond, or subsequent conviction requirements of 
Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a con-
viction under Section 41-6-45 which qualified as 
a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a first, 
second, or subsequent conviction under this sub-
section, a previous conviction under either this 
section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior 
conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and 
any community-based or other education pro-
gram provided for in this section shall be ap-
proved by the Department of Social Services. 
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of 
guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of 
Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under 
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a 
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of 
this section, the prosecution shall state for the 
record a factual basis for the plea, including 
whether or not there had been consumption of 
alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the offense. The 
statement is an offer of proof of the facts which 
shows whether there was consumption of alcohol 
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defen-
dant, in connection with the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection 
of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defen-
dant's plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of 
violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor 
states for the record that there was consumption 
of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by 
the defendant in connection with the offense, the 
resulting conviction is a prior offense for the pur-
poses of Subsection i5). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of 
each conviction of Section 43-6-45 which is a 
prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest 
a person for a violation of this section when the offi-
cer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the offi-
cer has probable cause to believe that the violation 
was committed by the person. 
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend 
for 90 days the operator's license of anv person con-
victed for the first time under Subsection (1). and 
shall revoke for one year the license of any person 
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection 
(1) if the violation is committed within a period of five 
years from the date of the prior violation. The depart-
ment shall subtract from any suspension or revoca-
tion period the number of days for which a license 
was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if 
the previous suspension was based on the same occur-
rence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
1988 
-41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analy-
sis — Evidence. 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety shall establish standards for the administra-
tion and interpretation of chemical analysis of a per-
son's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is mate-
rial to prove that a person was operating or in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influ-
ence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood 
or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, docu-
ments offered as memoranda or records of acts, condi-
tions, or events to prove that the analysis was made 
and the instrument used was accurate, according to 
standards established in Subsection (1), are admissi-
ble if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or about 
the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made 
and the method and circumstances of their prepa-
ration indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established 
under Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection 
(2) have been met, there is a presumption that the 
test results are valid and further foundation for intro-
duction of the evidence is unnecessary. 1987 
( 5 ) , U . C A . 
76-1 -402. Separate offenses arising out of single 
criminal episode — Included offenses. 
,5) If the district court on motion after verdict or 
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certio. 
rari, shall determine that there is insufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction for the offense charge 
but that there is sufficient evidence to support a con. 
viction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction ^ 
that included offense, the verdict or judgment of con-
viction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment 
of conviction entered for the included offense, without 
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by tt* 
defendant. y^ 
§ 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 3 ( 1 ) ( b ) ( i v ) , U.C.A. 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subse-
quent prosecution for offense out of 
same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or 
more offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, 
a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
barred if 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an of-
fense that was or should have been tried under 
Section 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; 
and 
(b) The former prosecution* 
d) resulted in acquittal; or 
(n) resulted in conviction, or 
(in) was improperly terminated, or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or 
judgment for the defendant that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that nec-
essarily required a determination inconsis-
tent with a fact that must be established to 
secure conviction in the subsequent prosecu-
tion 
§ 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 3 ( 2 ) , U.C.A. 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subse-
quent prosecution for offense out of 
same eoisode. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted 
in a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a 
determination that there was insufficient evidence to 
warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser 
included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense 
even though the conviction for the lesser included 
offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or va* 
cated. 
A. 
761-501. Presumption of innocence — "Ele-
ment of the offense" defined. 
(DA defendant in a criminal proceeding is pre-
sumed to be innocent until each element of the of-
fense charged against him is proved beyond a reason-
able doubt In absence of such proof, the defendant 
ahdll be acquitted 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the 
offense" mean 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or for-
bidden in the definition of the ofTense, 
(b) The culpable mental state required 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not 
dements of the offense but shall be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence 1*73 
§ 7 7 - 1 - 6 , U - C . A . 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is enti-
tled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person 
or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed 
against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against 
him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district where the offense is 
alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in <all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with 
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 
30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for 
the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those 
rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband nor a husband against his 
wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by ver-
dict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no con-
test, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, 
u\>::: i'.judfr.or.t by a magistrate. i960 
§ 7 7 - 3 5 - 2 6 , U.C.A. 
77-35-26. Rule 26 — Appeals [Repealed ef-
fective July 1, 1990]. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of 
the court from which the appeal is taken a notice of 
appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed from, 
and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his 
attorney of record Proof of service of the copy shall be 
filed with the court 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether 
by verdict or plea, 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting 
the substantial rights of the defendant, 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition 
for review, the appellate court decides that the 
appeal would be in the interest of justice, or 
(d) an> order of the court judging the defen-
dant by reason of a mental disease or defect in-
competent to proceed further in a pending prose-
cution 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution 
from 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, 
(b) an order arresting judgment, 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution be-
cause of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of 
a speedy trial, 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or 
anv part of it invalid, 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence when, upon a peti 
tion for review, the appellate court decides that 
the appeal would be in the interest of justice, or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilt} or no contest 
(4) (a) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken 
within 30 days after the entry of the judgment 
appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or 
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after 
notice of the denial of the motion is given to the 
defendant or his counsel Proof of giving notice 
shall be filed with the court 
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for 
a material defect in taking it, or for failure to 
perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appel 
lant The dismissal of the appeal affirms the 
judgment unless another appeal may be, and is, 
timely taken 
(6) Cases appealed in which the defendant is un-
able to post bond shall be given a preferred and expe 
ditious setting in the appellate court 
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs If an ap 
pellant's brief is filed, the appeal shall be decided 
even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails 
to appear for oral argument 
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals 
govern criminal appeals to the appellate court, except 
as otherwise provided 
(8) (a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital 
cases where the sentence of death has been im-
posed, appellant briefs shall be filed within 60 
days of the filing of the record on appeal Respon-
dent bnefs shall be filed within 60 days of receipt 
of the appellant brief All issues to be raised on 
appeal shall be included b> each party in its ap-
pellate brief Appellant reply briefs shall be filed 
within 30 days of receipt of the respondent's 
bnef 
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-da> filing 
period may be granted to each party, but onl> 
upon application to the Supreme Court showing 
extraordinary circumstances warranting an ex 
tension 
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the oral 
arguments of the case to be heard not more than 
ten days after the date of filing of the final brief 
Following oral arguments, the case shall be 
placed first on the Supreme Court s calendar, for 
expeditious determination 
(9) After an initial appeal has been resolved, a sub-
sequent appeal of a capital case where the sentence of 
death has been imposed may not be entertained by 
any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence 
be granted, when the appeal does not raise any new 
matter not previously resolved or when new matter 
could have been raised at the previous appeal 
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death 
has been imposed and the defendant has chosen not to 
pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatically 
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 da>s after 
certification by the sentencing court of the entire 
record, unless the time is extended b\ the Supreme 
Court for good cause A case involving the sentence of 
death has priority over all other cases in setting for 
bearing and in disposition by the Supreme Court 
(11) The rules of practice for the Court of Appeals 
find circuit courts made by the Judicial Council and 
approved by the Supreme Court relating to appeals 
from circuit courts govern criminal as well as civil 
appeals 
(12) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court 
o r
 the Court of Appeals as is appropriate, from all 
final orders and judgments rendered in a district 
court or juvenile court under this rule 
(13) An appeal may be taken to the circuit court 
from a judgment rendered in the justice court under 
this rule, except 
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the circuit 
court The decision of the circuit court is final 
except when the validity or constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court, 
(b) within 20 da>s after receipt of the notice of 
appeal, the justice court shall transmit to the cir 
cuit court a certified copy of the docket the ongi 
nal pleadings, all notices motions and other pa 
pers filed in the case, and the notice and under 
taking on appeal, 
(c) stay of execution and relief pending appeal 
are under Rule 27, Utah Rules of Court [Cnmi 
nal] Procedure, or 
(d) all further proceedings are in the circuit 
court, including any process required to enforce judgment — 
§ 7 8 - 4 - 7 . 5 f U.C.A. 
78-4-7.5. Trials de novo . 
The circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear 
tr ials de novo of the judgments of the justices' courts 
and t r ials de novo of the small claims department of 
the circuit court. 1988 
S / S - 3 - 1 4 , U . C . A . 
Rule 26(13) (a), Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
(13) An appeal may be taken to the circuit court 
from a judgment rendered in the justice court under 
this rule, except 
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the circuit 
court The decision of the circuit court is final 
except when the validity or constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court. 
w
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 9 " " " « U ^ S Of Evidfinro 
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil ac< 
tions and proceedings. 
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presumptions 
are inconsistent, the presumption applies that is 
founded upon weightier considerations of policy. \\ 
considerations of policy are of equal weight neither 
presumption applies. 
RU1e 3. Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judg-
ments. As defined and provided by law, an appeal 
may be taken from the final orders and judgments of 
a district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the 
Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is 
taken within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of 
an appellant to take any step other than the timely 
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity 
of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as 
the Court of Appeals deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions 
short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney 
fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more 
parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or an 
order and their interests are such as to make joinder 
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or 
join in an appeal of another party after filing separate 
timely notices of appeal. Such joint appeals may 
thereafter proceed and be treated as a single appeal 
with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be 
consolidated by order of the Court of Appeals on its 
own motion, on motion of a party, or by stipulation of 
the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c> Designation of parties. The party taking the 
appeal shall be known as the appellant and the ad-
verse party as the respondent. The title of the action 
or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of 
the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the 
Court of Appeals. In original proceedings in the Court 
of Appeals, the party making the original application 
shall be known as the plaintiff and any other party as 
the defendant. 
id) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of ap-
peal shall specify the party or parties taking the ap-
peal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part 
thereof, appealed from; shall name the court from 
which the appeal is taken; and shall designate that 
the appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking 
the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of 
appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judg-
ment or order or, if the party is not represented by 
counsel, to the party at the last known address of the 
party. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. 
At the time of filing any separate or joint notice of 
appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal 
shall pay to the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken such filing fees as are established by 
law and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the 
Court of Appeals. The clerk of the court from which 
the appeal is taken shall not accept a notice of appeal 
unless the filing and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the 
notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the 
clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken 
shall forthwith transmit one copy of the notice of ap-
peal, showing the date of its filing, together with the 
docketing fee, to the clerk of the Court of Appeals. 
Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and 
the docketing fee, the clerk of the Court of Appeals 
shall thereupon enter the appeal upon the docket. An 
appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the 
action in the court from which the appeal is taken, 
with the appellant identified as such, but if such title 
does not contain the name of the appellant, such 
name shall be added to the title. 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, NEPHI DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MARK MATUS, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 88-CR-0021 
Judge Lynn Davis 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendant, Mark Matus, is 
appealing from the conviction entered by the Honorable Lynn 
Davis, Judge of the above entitled court, on May 22, 1989, to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this 2-(o day of June, 1! 
LONI F ri D/eLAN^ T 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2/fc day of June, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to the Juab County Attorney, 125 North 
Main, Nephi, Utah 84648. 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK A MATUS 
1201 EAST 3745 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84106 
Defendant. 
Defendant is placed on unsupervised probation for a period of 6 
months. 
1. Defendant is to report to the Court whenever required to do 
so. 
2. Defendant is to keep on file and current with the Clerk of 
the Court defendant's mailing address. A Bench Warrant will issue 
for defendant's arrest if defendant fails to appear in Court after 
mailed notice. 
3. Defendant shall not violate any federal, state, or municipal 
law. 
4. Defendant is to pay a fine in the amount of $300.00, $75.00 
to Victim Reparation, $100.00 Victim Restitution, and $150.00 Alcohol 
Rehabilitation. 
5. The fine and fees are to be paid beginning June 22, 1989 and 
monthly thereafter until paid. 
6. The defendant is to serve 2 day jail in the Juab County jail 
within 90 days. The defendant may serve 24 hours of community 
service in lieu of the jail sentence within 90 days in the Salt Lake 
County area. 
Dated: May 22, 1989 
BY THE COURT 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
Case #88 CR 021 
Circuit Judge 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
MARK MATUS 
Plaintiff, 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
Case 88 CR 021 
Defendant 
No legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be 
pronounced, the Court now adjudges the above defendant guilty of: 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
Defendant is sentenced as follows: 
To pay a fine in the amount of $1000 and serve 180 days in the 
Juab County Jail. Defendant is also to pay $75 Victim Reparation, 
$100 Victim Restitution, and $150 Alcohol Rehabilitation, The court 
will suspend all of the jail but 2 days. The court will stay 
execution of the sentence 30 days pending appeal. 
Defendant is placed on unsupervised probation for a period of 6 
months, and the foregoing sentence will be suspended if defendant 
complies strictly with all conditions of probation.. 
Dated: May 22, 1989 
BY THE COURT. 
"V Circuit Judge 
-M THE CIRCUIT COURT 
p , . ~ /-. v I ITAH 
FZ3 ISKC'D 
cii 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, NEPHI DEPARTMENT **P 
IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
EVIDENCIARY MOTIONS, MOTION 
TO DISMISS, JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 88 CR 0021 
The above-captioned case came on regularly for a trial de novo before 
Judge Lynn W. Davis on 18 November, 1988. Plaintiff was represented by Donald 
J. Eyre, Juab County Attorney and defendant was represented by Loni F. DeLand 
Esq. A trial was conducted and testimony taken. During the course of trial 
various motions were entertained, all of which were taken under advisement. The 
Court has reviewed the testimony, considered the memorandum of counsel, 
entertained argument of counsel, and upon being advised in the premises, now 
makes the following: 
RULING 
I 
Defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the Circuit Court as provided 
for in U.C.A., 78-4-7.5: 
The Circuit Court has jurisdiction to hear 
trials de novo of the judgments of the justice's 
courts. 
The defendant was convicted in the Justice of the Peace Court, Nephi 
Department on June 23, 1988 of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
The Circuit Court possesses only such jurisdictional powers as are directly, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
MARK A. MATUS 
Defendant 
-2-
or indirectly, expressly or or by implication conferred upon it by the 
Constitution and by statutes consistent with the Consititution. The Justice 
of the Peace Court is not by statute a designated "court of record". The 
Circuit Court, therefore, is not an appellant court for the purpose of 
reviewing the "record" or findings of fact of an inferior court. 
Defendant made a motion at the commencement of the trial de novo that any 
evidence of impairment be excluded from the trial. That motion was taken under 
advisement. This Court is not convinced that its jurisdiction is derivative and 
is therefore limited to a de novo trial per the exact language of the appealed 
judgment. It is most critical to point out that while the defendant contends that 
this Court is restricted "to a de novo trial per the exact language of the appealed 
judgment", that the proposed judgment submitted by defense counsel to the 
Justice of the Peace Court was never executed by the Honorable Lane Harward, 
Justice of the Peace. Neither the "Judgment of Dismissal" nor the "Judgment of 
Conviction and Sentence Re: Charge of 'Driving Under The Influence1; Stay of 
Execution" were ever executed by the lower court judge. 
For some reason, unknown to this Court, the Honorable Lane Harward chose not 
to execute the documents as presented by defense counsel. He must have simply 
relied upon his judgment in open court on June 23, 1988. It is therefore, 
impossible to base an appeal upon the "exact language of the judgment" when 
said "judgment" lacks the judge's signature. 
Defendant asserts a limitation of evidence by virtue of the language contained 
in the proposed unsigned judgment. For obvious reasons defendant's motion must 
be denied and the court has no duty to "review" the record of June 23, 1988 in 
order to proceed in this case. The conviction was rendered by the Honorable 
Lane Hanvard on 23 June, 1988, an appeal was timely filed, and this Court then 
proceeded on a de novo trial, unhampered by the restrictions the defendant 
would place on it. 
II 
Counsel for Defendant next asserts that double jeopardy has attached and 
thus precludes a de novo trial on "impairment". While this approach is novel, 
it must fail on several grounds: 
a) First and Foremost, the proposed judgment, for whatever purpose or 
reason, was never executed by the inferior court as proposed. The restrictive 
language relied upon by defendant is simply not applicable and the tssue ts 
moot. 
-3-
b) Jeopardy concepts do not apply in this case. Even if the Court 
were restricted by the proposed language contained within the proposed 
judgment, only the breadth of limitation becomes an issue. Counsel has 
argued that a person may be conviced of DUI per the "impaired" driver 
provision of 41-6-44 (l)(a) with evidence of a breath/blood alcohol test; 
however, a test showing a BAC of .082 or greater not only infers "impairment", 
it constitutes the offense by itself as being presumptive of impairment. 
This Court reasons that even if the inferior court found "insufficient evidence 
of impairment to convince the court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
defendant was 'under the influence* as defined by 41-6-44 regarding safe 
operation of a motor vehicle" that that finding is not the same as a finding 
of insufficient evidence of impairment to support probable cause for arrest, 
neither is it the same as a finding of insufficient evidence of impairment 
to support an investigatory stop. Even if this Court were bound by the 
language, it may explore the issue of impairment and receive testimony. 
An officer must have "grounds to believe" that a person has been 
operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under 
section 41-6-44. U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (a). Counsel would advance the rule that 
if a justice of the peace failed to convict a driver as being "impaired" on a 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, that at trial de novo, no evidence of 
impairment may enter, even to support the "grounds to believe" standard. 
That simply is not the law and is not supported by any extant case law. There 
is a confusion of standard advanced by counsel. 
Ill 
Next, the defendant argues that the breath test results lack sufficient 
foundation for admission or were obtained without probable cause for arrest. 
This Court finds that the officer had "grounds to believe" before the breath 
test was administered. Those "grounds to" believe resulted from physical 
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observations (blood shot eyes, odor of alcohol, a boisterous and talkative 
nature) as well as the resultsAxhe field sobriety tests which ^^administered. 
Officers are not scientists, physicians or technicians. While inviolate 
standards are necessary to ensure a correct result in the performance of a 
breath test, it is the opinion of this Court that a lesser standard is necessary 
in the performance of field sobriety tests. 
Field sobriety tests are not subject to absolute and precise measurement 
and/or precise formulae because of their general roadside setting, varying 
lighting conditions and weather conditions,^e^. Whether one manifests outward 
signs of impairment always involves the issue of perception and of necessity 
requires an exercise of discretion. After reviewing the tests administered, 
together with their mode of administration, and the testimony of the expert 
witnesst, Officer Gary Taylor, this Court finds that the results provided 
suffieft€^frt foundation for the officer to proceed and administer the breath 
test. 
Finally, this Court finds that defendant's argument reqarding the 
officer's lack of certification to be without merit. 
Having addressed defendant's motions and objections, this Court finds 
the defendant, Mark A. Matus, guilty of driving a motor vehicle at a time 
when his blood alcohol content was .08 percent or greater by weight or was 
under the influence of alcohol; contrary to section 41-6-44 U.C.A. 1953 as 
amended. 
The Clerk of the Court is instructed to schedule this matter for 
sentencing, not less than two (2) days, no more than thirty (30) days from 
date hereon, unless waived by the defendant or his counsel. 
DATED: February 16, 1989 
BY*THE/COURT 
#%a%£^T 
Hon. Lynn W. Davis 
Circuit Court Judge 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, NEPHI DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
V . i 
MARK A. MATUS, ] 
Defendant. 
i MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
1 AND AUTHORITIES 
Case No. 88CR-0021 
1 Judge Lynn Davis 
FACTS 
Defendant was arrested on February 14, 1988, and 
charged with "DUI" and "Open Container" offenses before the 
Justice's Court in Nephi, Utah. 
Justice of the Peace, Lane Harward, presided over the 
bench trial on the above charges against Defendant on June 23, 
1988. Defendant's motion to dismiss the Open Container charge 
due to an unlawful search was granted at the close of the State's 
evidence at trial. 
Justice Harward found the Defendant guilty of DUI per 
41-6-44 on the basis that he had operated a vehicle with a blood 
alcohol content of .08% or higher but specifically found the 
evidence insufficient to support a conviction of the alternative 
manner of committing the offense; i.e., operating a vehicle while 
too impaired by alcohol to safely do so. 
Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court and received a 
trial <de novo before Judge Lynn Davis, sitting without a jury on 
November 18, 1988. 
Just prior to commencement of the latter trial, Defen-
dant moved to strike or to excise the language in the criminal 
information which alleged the "impairment" section of the statute 
which the court below had found to have not been violated; 
therefore asking to be tried for DUI on the sole element of ".08% 
or greater". 
The court took the matter under advisement and pro-
ceeded to trial without limitation as to the State's offering of 
evidence as to either or both manners of offending the DUI 
statute. 
Per the parties' stipulation, the court granted Defen-
dant a continuing objection to adducement by the state of evi-
dence regarding DUI by "impairment". 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S JURISDICTION IS DERIVATIVE AND 
IS THEREFORE LIMITED TO DE NOVO TRIAL PER 
THE EXACT LANGUAGE OF THE APPEALED JUDGMENT 
Defendant's appeal grants him a trial de novo in this 
Court, but only on the "judgment" from which he appeals. 
(U.C.A., 78-4-7.5 and 78-5-14.) Therefore, if a defendant is 
convicted of two offenses in the Justices' Court and only appeals 
from one such judgmentf he may only receive a trial de novo on 
the one appealed. 
The Circuit Courts' jurisdiction on appeal is deriva-
tive. Even though the appellate proceeding is de novo, the 
Circuit only obtains jurisdiction over the appealed ruling. 
Spangler v. District Court, 140 P.2d 755 (1943). Thus, where a 
Complaint was defective on one element but the Justice of the 
Peace found the defendant guilty nevertheless, the de novo 
appellate court properly denied the state's motion to amend the 
Complaint to conform with the law and dismissed the charge. 
State v. Mansfield, 576 P.2d 1276 (1978). . 
Under the Mansfield reasoning, had this Defendant 
(Matus) been charged with DUI in the Justices1 Court by an 
Information which failed to allege the "impairment" section of 
41-6-44, the circuit Court could not allow the Information to be 
amended by addition of the negligently omitted language. (At 
1277.) 
In this case the Justices' Court's judgment of con-
viction is specifically limited to the ".08%" element of DUI and 
expressly finds in the emorandum decision that the conjunctive 
element of "impairment lacked sufficient proof and was therefore 
excluded from the judgment, thereby basing the conviction solely 
on the elements of: 
1. Driving a motor vehicle; 
2. With a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater. 
Section 41-6-44 allows the State to prove either (or 
both) element(s) for conviction. It could not prove the "impair-
ment" (albeit unnecessary) element in the first trial. 
The State now seeks to do the reverse of Mansfield. 
I.e., even though both conjunctive elements were charged, only 
one survived below, it being implicit, therefore, that the court 
below "amended" the charge to conform with the evidence. 
The judgment of conviction below went only to the ".08" 
element. Ergo, a de novo trial beyond that decision would, in 
essence, "amend" the Justice's express judgment by adding the 
"impairment" element back in. 
Since this Defendant only appealed from the express 
Judgment and the State filed no appeal, this Court would exceed 
its jurisdiction by denying Defendant's motion herein. 
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRECLUDES DE NOVO REVIEW OF "IMPAIRMENT" 
Amendment V of the U.S. Constitution and Article I. 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution prohibit placing a person 
twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Further, Sections 76-1-402 and 403, Utah Code Annotated 
bar subsequent prosecution for an offense where a trial court has 
found insufficient evidence to convict, however, it may affirm a 
conviction or allow a retrial on an included offense if there was 
sufficient evidence at trial to support a conviction of the 
included offense which occurred during the single criminal 
episode. (76-1-402(5); 76-1-403(2), U.C.A.) 
Where the trial court has entered a judgment or final 
order "for the Defendant", further prosecution inconsistent with 
the judgment or order is barred. (76-l-403(b)(iv)). 
In Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 
U.S. 294 (1984), the Supreme Court viewed a de novo trial system 
like Utah's to be a single, continuing process. On point, the 
Court held that only an "official finding" by the lower court of 
"insufficiency of the evidence" would bar a retrial. Lydcn was 
not entitled to an appellate review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence at the first trial but could require subsequent courts 
to adopt official findings favorable to him. 
The strict rule of appellate review is to permit 
retrial where the trial court's evidentiary rulings are in issue 
but bar retrial when the issue is sufficiency of the evidence. 
The landmark case adopting the strict rule on jeopardy, 
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), was applied to the 
states in Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978) and Sanabria v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978). 
Even prior to Burks, the Court held in favor of barring 
retrial in cases similar to Matus. In Green v. United States, 
355 U.S. 184 (1957), the defendant was charged with arson and 
first degree murder. The jury found Green guilty of an arson and 
second degree murder. The conviction was reversed on appeal and 
remanded and a second jury found him guilty of arson and first 
degree murder. The Green court held that the first jury, by 
finding Green guilty of second degree murder, had implicitly 
found insufficient evidence of first degree; therefore, the 
double jeopardy clause forbade a subsequent charge/prosecution 
for a first degree. In other words, the second indictment (or 
information) could not include the element(s) of first degree 
murder in its charge. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has defined the test for the 
instant case: "The applicable rule is that where the same act or 
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are 
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires 
proof of a fact which the other does not." BIork-Burger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 
161 (1977). 
A person may be convicted of DUI per the "impaired" 
driver provision of 41-6-44(1)(a) with evidence of a breath/blood 
alcohol test; however, a test showing a BAC of .08% or greater 
not only infers "impairment", it constitutes the offense by 
itself as being presumptive of impairment. Therefore, jeopardy 
concepts do apply in this case since the first trial judge, by 
written order or judgment, found the evidence insufficient to 
convict. 
III. THE BREATH TEST RESULTS LACK 
SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION FOR ADMISSION OR 
WERE OBTAINED WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST 
A. FOUNDATION 
Section 41-6-44.3, U.C.A., says the Commissioner of 
Public Safety "shall" establish standards regarding breath 
testing. Those standards, as confirmed by witness Trooper 
Taylor, mandate specific steps for acceptable breath test results 
and require operators to be fully certified at "the moment" the 
test is given, which certification must be renewed at regular and 
specified intervals. 
The breath test operator in this case, Trooper Howard, 
testified that he did not know whether he followed the commis-
sioner's regulations in this instance since he was not familiar 
with them. The regulations, though in Trooper Taylor's pos-
session at trial, were not introduced. 
There was no testimony or other evidence at trial as to 
whether Trooper Howard was certified to operate the breath 
testing instrument when he administered the subject test to Mr. 
Matus, herein, on February 14, 1988. 
The only related evidence was the admitted exhibit, 
i.e., Howard's present record of certification, which showed it 
was due to expire in February of 1990, viz., "2/90." It did not 
state when it was issued. 
The requirements of 41-6-44.3 are such that the prose-
cution has the burden of providing the court with the foundation 
mandated "according to the standards" before the court may 
properly admit the breath test results. No such burden was met 
in this case. 
1. The court cannot determine compliance with the 
standards without knowing what they mandate, particularly where 
the operator-witness doesn't know, himself; 
2. Since no evidence is before the court as to Trooper 
Howard's certification status at test-time, the court may not 
infer such; 
3. Even if, as argued by Defendant at trial, it were 
stipulated that "the standards" require certification not longer 
than every two years, the exhibit regarding Howard's certifica-
tion is still insufficient proof of his status on February 14, 
1988. At best, the court may infer Howard's certification was 
obtained sometime in "2/88". Two years in any legal context is 
not two years and one day. 
Since the certification expires in February, 1988, the 
most favorable inference for the State is that he renewed it in 
February of 1988. But when? It is equally possible that he was 
certified before or after the 14th. 
Ties go to the accused. It is the State's burden to 
prove the operator was certified . . . by written record or by 
his testimony. Mr. Eyre argued that Trooper Taylor had all 
troopers' certification records and "could be" called to produce 
them; however, no such evidence was offered, nor did Howard 
testify on point. 
50/50 is not even a preponderance. The court would be 
left to speculate, not infer a proper foundation, even if this 
test were given on February 27th. 
The rules regarding presumptions of fact require a 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt, upon the evidence, before 
accepting the presumption. 
"If presumptions of fact are inconsistent, the presump-
tion applies that is founded upon weightier considerations of pol 
Rule 301(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Defendant submits that the weightiest presumption of 
all is the "presumption of innocence". 76-1-501, U.C.A.; U.S. 
Constitution, Amendment V.; Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 
XII. 
It follows that a presumption of compliance with "the 
standards", (including Howard's certification) is a presumption 
of factual foundation for admission of the test per 41-6-44.3 
which, in turn "presumes" the trustworthiness of the test results 
which exceed .08%. Therefore, the court has presumed the proof 
of an element of this offense. "The" element, in fact. Such a 
presumption (of an element), is unconstitutional. Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 
(1983). 
B. PROBABLE CAUSE 
No arrest may be made except upon probable cause. 
Evidence obtained from an arrest which doesn't meet the probable 
cause standard must be suppressed or excluded. Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
Utah lav; forbids the administering of a breath test 
unless the subject is under arrest for DUI based upon sufficient 
probable cause. (See 41-6-44.10(1)(a) and (2)(a), U.C.A., and 
annotations.) Test results following an invalid arrest are not 
admissible. (Of course/ lack of probable cause would, in this 
case, dispose of the entire charge.) 
There was no "driving pattern" in this case indicative 
of even mere suspicion of DUI. After the stop, the odor of 
alcohol was noted; however, the arresting officer testified to 
the obvious, i.e., no probable cause existed prior to the field 
sobriety tests. 
Trooper Taylor, the State's expert, testified that the 
UHP standardized field tests were to be given exactly as taught 
because of the scientific or medical bases, as set forth in the 
attendant point system, for objectively interpreting the sub-
ject's impairment or lack thereof. Trooper Taylor made it clear 
that Trooper Howard's version of the standardized tests was a 
major departure from the standards and that the results could not 
be considered as valid unless Trooper Howard could demonstrate 
personal knowledge of the scientific/medical bases underlying the 
"Howard test standards". 
Howard was totally off base in the point values and the 
actual method (not to mention the mere name) of administering the 
"horizontal gaze nystagmus" test. 
On the remaining tests he didn't even utilize the 
standard (or any), point values. Nor did he follow the standard 
requirements on the other tests, therefore, (per Taylor), no 
underlying and reliable bases for validation are possible since 
Howard offered none that made a modicum of sense. 
Howard may have, in good faith, believed he had proba-
ble cause, but under the detached reasonable person concept no 
finder of fact can reach the same conclusion from his tests. The 
results add absolutely nothing to the admitted pre-test lack of 
probable cause. The results are as relevant as if Howard's tests 
were the standing broad jump, the Rohrschack, a recital of the 
Gettysburg Address and the "Abner Shumway Vertical Ogle Palsy" 
test. 
The finder of fact must be convinced that the perfor-
mance is evidence of impairment as supported by scientific 
testing. Just because Howard thinks Matus failed has no bearing 
on probable cause unless there is a reasonable basis for Howard 
to so believe. He could not articulate any. To find otherwise 
is tantamount to accepting testimony which only says, "I gave him 
four tests and he failed them," without anything other than that 
conclusory statement. 
When given its proper weight, the field test evidence, 
coupled with the odor and other articulable facts, may provide a 
"reasonable suspicion'1 of DUI (per 77-7-15, U.C.A.), butr at 
best, provides probable cause to believe Defendant had been 
drinking, (not an offense), or to believe that he was unable to 
fully comprehend and perform the strange and meaningless roadside 
exercises of the Howard repertoire. 
SUMMARY 
This Court should only consider evidence of the n.08% 
or greater" provision of the DUI statute in this trial, the 
Justice Court having adjudged, on the evidence, that "impairment" 
was not proved. 
Even if the court denies Defendant's motion regarding 
double jeopardy and considers evidence as to both elements of 
DUI, the evidence is insufficient to convict on the "impairment" 
provision. 
The court should also exclude the breath test evidence 
since the State has failed to meet its burden to provide suffi-
cient foundation for admission of the test results, viz., compli-
ance with the requisite standards, particularly with respect to 
operator certification. 
Finally, the arresting officer's subjective obser-
vations, particularly with respect to his field test procedures, 
could not support a finding that he had probable cause to arrest 
this Defendant nor obtain a breath test and the breath test 
result is therefore inadmissible; in fact, the absence of evi-
dence arising to probable cause should convince this Court to 
dismiss the DUI charge or acquit the Defendant. 
DATED this 6th day of December, 1988. 
LONI F. /DeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of December, 1988, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Donald J. Eyre, Juab County Attorney, 
125 North Main, Nephi, Utah 84648. 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE NEPHI PRECINCT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. ' , 
MARK A. MATUS, 
Defendant. 
) JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND 
• SENTENCE RE: CHARGE OF 
) "DRIVING UNDER THE 
1 INFLUENCE"; STAY OF 
1 EXECUTION 
i Case No. 875-121 
1 Judge Lane Harward 
This matter came on for trial in the above court before 
the Honorable Lane Harward/ Justice of the Peace, presiding, 
without a jury, at 10:00 a.m./ June 23/ 1988/ on the charge of 
"driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood alcohol content of 0.08% or greater; or 
while under the influence of (alcohol) to a degree which rendered 
Defendant incapable of safely driving" in violation of 41-6-44/ 
U.C.A./ as amended. 
The Defendant was not present but was represented by 
counsel/ Loni F. DeLand. Said Defendant's presence at trial was 
waived by the court at the express request of Defendant's counsel 
who represented to the court that Defendant had expressly 
authorized said counsel to proceed on his behalf, in every 
respect, in his unavoidable absence. 
The State presented it's evidence against Defendant by 
and through the sworn testimony of its witnesses, Highway Patrol 
Troopers Carl Howard and Randy Ingram. After the State rested 
its case herein, Defendant's attorney moved to dismiss the 
instant charge on the basis that the the arresting officer had 
insufficient probable cause therefore. Said motion was denied. 
Defendant rested without presenting any evidence or 
witness testimony, at which time counsel for each side presented 
closing arguments. 
After hearing the testimony of the State's witnesses 
and after admitting and reviewing the State's exhibits regarding 
the breath test results (0.14%) and after considering arguments 
of counsel, the court found that: 
a. There was insufficient evidence of impairment to 
convince the court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant was 
"under the influence" as defined by 41-6-44 regarding safe 
operation of a motor vehicle; 
b. However, there was sufficient evidence to convince 
the court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant, at the 
time and place alleged, was operating or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content 
greater than 0.08%. 
The court therefore found the Defendant guilty of the 
said offense and it is thereby 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a conviction for "Driving 
Under the Influence" be entered against said Defendant herein. 
STAY OF ENTRY OF CONVICTION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the said entry of conviction 
be, and is, STAYED for 30 days pending the filing of Notice of 
Appeal in the Fourth Circuit Court, if he so decides. 
However, in the event Defendant's Notice of Appeal is 
not filed within 30,days, (nbt later than July 23, 1988), the 
sentence of this court, as decreed on June 23, 1988, pursuant to 
the stipulation of Defendant's counsel, shall be executed as 
follows: 
SENTENCE 
1. Pay a fine of $480.00; reparation fee of $120.00; 
victim fund restitution of $100.00; DUI training fee of $150.00 -
a grand total of $850.00 in fines and fees; 
a. A payment schedule may be arranged v/ith the court 
if no appeal is filed; 
b. All payments shall be to Juab County irrespective 
of the location Defendant attends DUI training. 
2. Completion of appropriate DUI training classes to 
be arranged through Mr. Memmott; however, Defendant may so attend 
in his county of residence. 
3. Ninety days in jail; 88 days suspended upon payment 
of all fines and fees and completion of DUI training. 
4. Forty-eight hours, consecutive, in the Juab County 
Jail or, in lieu thereof, 24 hours of community service to any 
worthwhile project of Defendant's choosing to be approved by Mr. 
Memmott and with proof of completion submitted to the court. 
DATED this f ~ day of ^(/A. , 1988. 
THE/HOtfORABLE LANE HARWARD 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / H day of June, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Donald J. Eyre, Jr., Juab County 
Attorney, 125 North Main, Nephi, Utah 84648. 
ftu/sn. fahth 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE NEPHI PRECINCT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARK A. MATUS, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 875-121 
Judge Lane Harward 
This matter came on for trial in the above court before 
the Honorable Lane Harward, Justice of the Peace, presiding, 
without a jury, at 10:00 a.m., June 23, 1988, on the charge of 
"Open Container" in violation of §41-6-44.20, U.C.A., as amended. 
The Defendant was not present but was represented by 
counsel, Loni F. DeLand. Said Defendant's presence at trial was 
waived by the court at the express request of Defendant's counsel 
who represented to the court that Defendant had expressly au-
thorized said counsel to proceed on his behalf, in every respect, 
in his unavoidable absence. 
The State presented it's evidence against Defendant by 
and through the sworn testimony of its witnesses, Highway Patrol 
Troopers Carl Howard and Randy Ingram. After the State rested 
its case herein, Defendant's attorney moved to dismiss the 
instant charge on the bases that the arrest of Defendant by 
Trooper Howard was unlawful and in violation of §77-7-1, U.C.A., 
in that the alleged offense was not committed in his presence; 
that there was insufficient evidence presented to establish a 
prima facie case as to this Defendant on this charge, and; that 
the search of the subject vehicle and seizure of the evidence 
therefrom, i.e., open containers, which comprised the corpus 
dilecti of the alleged offense, were executed without a warrant 
and in the absence of any lawful exception to the warrant re-
quirement. 
After considering the evidence presented by the State 
and hearing the arguments of counsel regarding said Motion to 
Dismiss, the court found that Defendant's arguments were persua-
sive and therefore did conclude that it be: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss be, and is, GRANTED. 
It is therefore the JUDGMENT of this Court that the 
charge against this Defendant herein is DISMISSED with prejudice, 
that said Defendant is discharged and his bail, if any be posted, 
is exonerated and that any and all records of his arrest and 
prosecution on this charge be expunged. 
DATED this / *- day of TJWfr , 1988. 
tflE HONORABLE LANE HARWARD 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the (f\ day of June, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Donald J. Eyre, Jr., Juab County 
Attorney, 125 North Main, Nephi, Utah 84648. 
Dnunft, Pfihok-h-
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE * DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE NEPHI PRECINCT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARK A. MATUS, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 875-121 
Judge Lane Harvard 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant, Mark A. Matus, 
hereby appeals to the Fourth Circuit Court from the judgment of 
conviction on the charge of "Driving Under the Influence", which 
was entered on the 23rd day of June, 1988, by the above-entitled 
court. 
DATED this ^y day of June, 1988. / 
LONI F. /DeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the m. day of June, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Donald J. Eyre, Jr., Juab County 
Attorney, 125 North Main, Nephi, Utah 84648. 
Dn/tjon, ffihkto 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Telephone: (801) 364 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK A. MATUS, 
Petitioner, , 
v. 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Bureau 
Chief, Driver License Services, ] 
Department of Public Safety, 
Respondent. ) 
I ORDER GRANTING PETITION 
) AND REINSTATING PETITIONER'S 
I DRIVER'S LICENSE 
Case No. C88-2256 
Judge Raymond Uno 
Based upon the foregoing Stipulation, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the Petition filed on or about April 1, 1988, 
in the above-captioned matter is granted; 
2. That the Order of Suspension, suspending Petition-
er's driver's license effective March 15, 1988, is vacated; and 
3. Petitioner's driving privileges be reinstated by 
the Respondent or his agent immediately. 
84102 
1333 
Hfc: 
\ 
\Dtpu tv Ci#rk 
DATED this _</?/) day of ftprt-1, 1988. 
ATTEST 
ft V>' W .^ ""f V > \ i ^'•; RAYMOND UNO 
By^,},*v;V" ^  -V'C^ : V^T" District Cou 
9-^y^^n^ij/.. M*-+ 
"""•V^T rt Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the X day of April, 1988, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Bruce M. Hale, attorney for Respondent, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
;^ATE OF UTAH 
DEPUTY 
